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The New Regime for Oil Spill Liability in the United States
Richard L. Jarashow *
Waterborne transportation of goods, commodities and other materials
is a necessity of our industrialized society. While one could imagine
a world with no ships, and thus no oil pollution from ships, it must be
acknowledged this is unrealistic in our lifetime, and probably for many
generations beyond that.
In the United States, there are hundreds of vessels within the navi-
gable waters of the East, Gulf and West Coasts on any given day. To the
North, we share with Canada a common interest in the purity and natu-
ral beauty of the Great Lakes, where shipping is vital for ports both
north and south of the border, such as Cleveland, Chicago, Toronto,
Sarnia and Thunder Bay. Of course, we share substantial ocean re-
sources on both coasts, where shipping continues to increase in terms of
yearly vessel tonnage, particularly in the Vancouver/Seattle region as
part of the Pacific Rim land bridge.
Generally speaking, for purposes of oil pollution, there are two types
of vessels: tankers which carry persistent black oils and oil products as
cargo, and bulk or container vessels which do not. Both types of vessels
spill oil and have the potential to pollute environmentally sensitive areas;
one in a very damaging way and the other in a catastrophically damaging
way. Our greatest environmental problems, of course, occur with respect
to persistent black oil tanker spills.
By far, the vast majority of oil pollution, in terms of numbers of
incidents, occurs through operational spills - where a valve is turned
accidentally in the wrong direction leading to a spill of several barrels, or
where oily water ballast is released into the seas leading to the discharge
of several tons.I For the ten year period ending in 1983, over seventy-five
percent of all oil spills were the result of routine operations.2 To try to
minimize these kinds of discharges, where the cumulative effect is more
significant than any single event, virtually the entire maritime world, in-
cluding the United States (currently under consideration by Canada), has
joined the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, which sets international compliance standards for operational oil
discharges.3 The success of MARPOL is due largely to the fact that it
* Partner, Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens (New York, New York).
I A discussion of vessel operational spills is contained in DAVID ABECASSIS & RICHARD L.
JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM SHIPS ch. 3 (2d ed. 1985).
2 Id. at 4-09.
3 Nov. 2, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319. This Convention is published together with its 1978 Protocol
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has been applied almost universally.
With respect to oil pollution liability, the situation is not so clear or
uniform. In 1969, there was opened for ratification the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage ("CLC"),4
which together with a sister convention, the International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, ("Fund Convention")5 created a framework for uni-
form civil damages assessment and remuneration for oil spill incidents.
Since the CLC and Fund Conventions were opened for signature, some
forty-seven maritime nations have acceded or ratified them.6 The list in-
cludes most of the major maritime nations of the world, including Can-
ada, England, France, Japan, the Russian Federation, Germany,
Norway, Greece and Denmark. While other important maritime states
have failed to accept the international regime, the most important non-
signatory is the United States.
The United States is the world's largest importer of oil. In 1990, the
United States imported a total of 277 million tons of seaborne oil,7 com-
pared with approximately 40 million tons shipped into Canada in 1989.8
This means that for every day of the year, vessels carry an average of
770,000 tons (5,400,000 barrels) of oil into the United States and another
111,000 tons per day into Canada. By way of comparison, the Exxon
Valdez spilled 44,000 tons of oil into Alaskan waters in 1989, 9 and the
well-studied Nestucca spill off Vancouver Island in 1988 was a mere 875
tons. ° The magnitude of oil shipment activity in the United States
clearly raises oil pollution prevention and damage recovery to a high
level of importance.
To truly understand the significance of the United States' rejection
of the international framework and its adoption of a parochial domestic
(Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546) in International Maritime Organization ("IMO") Publication
No. 525.82.19 [hereinafter Marpol 73/78]. As of July 1991, there were sixty-eight ratifications or
accessions to Marpol 73/78. 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 6-62.63 - 6-62.69 (7th ed. 1991).
4 Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 I.L.M. 45 [hereinafter CLC].
5 Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, 11 I.L.M. 284 [hereinafter Fund Convention].
6 As of 31 December 1991, the following forty-seven states were Members of the Fund estab-
lished under the Fund Convention: Algeria, Bahamas, Benin, Cameroon, Canada, C6te d'Ivoire,
Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia (from 30 January 1992), Ger-
many, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Liberia, Maldives, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rus-
sian Federation, Seychelles, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, tunisia, Tuvalu,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Yugoslavia.
7 Intertanko Comments to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Financial Responsibility (Janu-
ary 24, 1992) [hereinafter Intertanko Comments] (on file with author).
8 PUBLIC REVIEW PANEL ON TANKER SAFETY AND MARINE SPILLS RESPONSE CAPABILITY,
FINAL REPORT 20 (September 1990) [hereinafter BRANDER-SMITH REPORT] (on file with author).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 8.
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regime, certain facts about the shipping industry must be recognized;
some of these facts are obvious, and some are not:
" Transportation by vessel is an inherently dangerous activity, and
much of the danger is beyond the control of the ship operator.
Early shipping legislation in the United States and worldwide rec-
ognized this fact by passing special laws on limited liability in or-
der to promote shipping investment,11 much like nuclear energy
investment today.
" Ships move. They are not like real estate, but are complex mov-
ing machines that cannot be regulated in the same way as a statio-
nary instrument like a manufacturing plant.
" As a result, it is a given that vessels are subject to different legal
regimes each time they move from place to place, adding com-
plexity and uncertainty to the means by which their business is
conducted.
* The shipping industry is extremely competitive, and profit mar-
gins can be thin. This undoubtedly results in temptations for
marginal operators; a very significant portion of the World's
tanker fleet is owned by single ship operators. In 1990, independ-
ent tanker owners transported about fifty-eight percent of all oil
imported into the United States.12 Not all single ship operators,
and certainly not all independent tanker operators, are marginal,
but single ship ownership is the most likely vehicle for marginal
operators.
" As a corollary to thin profitability and heavy capital investment
requirements, the industry is totally dependent on the availability
of insurance for its risks in view of the enormity of potential spill
liability. Simply put, without insurance, there is no shipping
industry.
Given these factors, it is beyond debate that regulation of the ship-
ping industry in the area of oil spills.is a necessity, and the sense of virtu-
ally all responsible shipowners and underwriters is not only to accept
this, but to welcome it. To the extent marginal operators are taken out of
the business, a level playing field remains for the responsible operators to
compete for profits. Fewer spills means fewer payouts for marine under-
writers, thus bringing about lower insurance costs and continued availa-
bility of a reinsurance market. A good environmental record is per se
good business for the shipping industry.
Recognizing the need for regulation, however, only identifies the
problem, because, like all well-intentioned laws, the oil spill laws of the
11 See AnEcAssis & JARASHOW, supra note 1, at 9-29 to 9-41, 17-03 to 17-05. In the United
States, vessel limitation is governed generally by the Limitation of Liability Act of 1951, 9 Stat. 635
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189). See also 3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY (7th ed.
1991); GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, Jr., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 818-957 (2d ed.
1975).
12 Intertanko Comments, supra note 7, at 7.
3
Jarashow: The New Regime for Oil Spill Liability in the United States
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1992
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
United States should be a vehicle to promote socially acceptable activi-
ties, which should include dealing with the dynamic tension between
mandating clean seas and encouraging a responsible industry for the
transportation of oil. Both are critical to our well-being. The current oil
spill liability laws in the United States do no such thing.
As previously noted, most of the major maritime nations of the
world are party to the CLC and Fund Conventions, and a growing
number are signatories of the as yet to be implemented 1984 Protocol, 3
which primarily increases available funds to pay for spill damage. The
United States has adopted a domestic regime which has rejected the call
for a uniform international approach to oil pollution liability.
The reasons for the U.S. failure to adopt the CLC and Fund Con-
ventions are largely historical, based on the fact that U.S. domestic oil
spill laws preceded the international scheme. Also, there has been a sort
of a "Yankee Nationalism" which holds that acceptance of an interna-
tional order is inconsistent with local needs and is an abdication of local
control. This is, in part, true, but is nevertheless non-responsive to the
broader issue of a need for an international regime.
The international regime, which is supported by compulsory insur-
ance, provides a scheme of strict but limited liability to cover cleanup,
remediation and economic damage. Over and above shipowner liability
is a fund financed by member states through an oil receipts tax, generat-
ing available funds of about $260 million per incident under the 1984
Protocol - inadequate for the Exxon Valdez, but apart from that spill,
large enough to pay for any settled claims from any other tanker spill yet
reported. Apart from Exxon Valdez, the average liability for a major
spill has been less than $10 million. The minor spills are considerably
less, well under $1 million per spill. Thus, the international scheme, as
modified, with its $260 million fund, provides for full non-fault based
compensation in most cases, and it provides for unlimited liability in
cases of actual fault or privity of the shipowner, a further incentive for
good conduct. It also provides for international recognition of any judg-
ments against shipowners under the scheme and thus offers a more effec-
tive worldwide mechanism to recover against foreign single ship
operators.
The CLC and Fund Conventions evolved as a result of the outrage
felt by the international community from the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil
spill, in which there was no clear authority for a coastal state to deal with
cleanup and liability, and there was no effective regime to cause the re-
sponsible party to pay for the damages done.1 4 Outrage, however, is
probably too strong a word to describe the Torrey Canyon reaction in the
13 A draft of the Protocol of 1984 to Amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Oil Pollution Damage is provided at 23 I.L.M. 177 [hereinafter 1984 Protocol].
14 BRANDER-SMITH REPORT, supra note 8, at 83; ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 1, at
10-04.
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United States. The perception of need in the European Community, led
by the English and French who were most effected by Torrey Canyon
and who were surrounded by international trade routes, was much
weaker in the United States.
First, Torrey Canyon was not "our" disaster. Second, historically,
oil pollution from ships was not a significant problem in the United
States in 1969. Third, by 1969 the United States already had what it
perceived to be a well-defined and effective body of laws which dealt
comprehensively with oil pollution.15 Fourth, given the economic posi-
tion of the United States and the magnitude of its oil trading activities, it
was economically in a better position to act independently of other na-
tions in formulating its oil spill policy.
Neither the U.S. public at large nor the government, nor even the
domestic maritime community, felt a strong motivation to fix what was
not broken. Politics in the United States is not unlike the politics of most
nations: Congress and the President do not generally seek the ideal solu-
tion, but rather react to the pressure of the moment.
Accordingly, in 1970, and the years thereafter, when Congress and
the administration were asked to endorse the CLC and Fund Conven-
tions, the backdrop was perceived as a non-problem in the U.S., together
with a belief that the U.S. was already far ahead of the rest of the world
in dealing with oil pollution as part of a larger domestic ecomonic policy.
There was a pervasive belief that oil pollution was a local problem, not an
international one, needing local, not international, solutions.
Thus, it was in 1970, as a direct reaction to Torrey Canyon, that
Congress arrived at a crossroads in how it would look at oil pollution. It
could have moved toward the CLC, as many in the maritime community
were urging, or it could have continued along the old road of going it
alone.
The result was really an anticlimax once the historical and political
backdrop is understood. The local lobby, taking the view that oil pollu-
tion was a domestic, not an international problem, clearly prevailed, es-
pecially where many felt the liability limits were too low in the 1969
international scheme prior to the 1984 Protocol limits.
The result was the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,16 a
powerful new comprehensive law which, as later amended, and together
with the maritime common law of tort, was the federal scheme for clean-
up and removal liability. It lasted until the new legislation of 1990, itself
a product of front page headlines from Alaska.
This 1970 Federal regime was not unacceptable either to the inter-
national shipping community or to domestic political interests. A state
15 See, eg., New York Harbor Act of 1866, 24 Stat. 329; The Refuse Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407); Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 604, amended by, 80
Stat. 1252, repealed by, 84 Stat. 113; Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1155.
16 84 Stat. 91.
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law was then passed in 1970, and a case was decided in 1973 analyzing
that law, which turned oil spill liability legislation on its ear. The 1970
law was Florida's oil pollution law,17 and the 1973 case was Askew v. The
American Waterways Operators, Inc.,18 decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
The 1970 Florida statute, among other things, provided for strict,
unlimited liability for oil spilled in Florida waters. Askew was a chal-
lenge to the Florida statute on the ground that both the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act and the general maritime law of the United States
preempted the states from passing inconsistent legislation. The Court
unanimously held, reversing the lower federal court, that the states were
indeed entitled to legislate in the area of oil pollution damages, notwith-
standing the existing federal law.
Askew was a pivotal point, which has put our oil spill laws in disar-
ray. This is so because shipping, with its international dimension and the
special characteristics discussed earlier, must permit the implementation
of a single special policy towards it. This need for consistency and
universality has been recognized in many maritime areas:
* There is one federal general maritime law of the United States
recognized by the U.S. Constitution, not fifty individual state
laws. 19
" There is a requirement for uniformity through federal law for the
design and construction of ships,2 ° which cannot be overridden by
state law.
• There is one federal law governing a multitude of shipping topics,
such as bills of lading," marine inspections, rights of innocent
passage and others.
Why then has maritime environmental law been treated differently?
This is a complicated question, which really has a simple answer: en-
vironmentalism as a social policy has created a domestic political situa-
tion where local concerns clearly outweigh the maritime need for
uniformity.
Thus, in 1989, Congress was again asked to approve the interna-
tional regime which it had debated since at least as early as 1984, when
the IMO drafted the Protocol which adopted increased fund limits as
urged by the United States delegation. With the acceptance of the U.S.
endorsed limits, the Administration undertook to obtain U.S. ratification
of the international regime.
The deadlock that years of debate in Congress could not overcome
17 1970 Fla. Laws ch. 70-244.
18 411 U.S. 325 (1975).
19 See, e.g., American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla.
1971). See also GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 11, at 47-5 1.
20 See, eg., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
21 Carriage of Goods By Sea Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1207 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1300-1315).
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was shattered in March 1989. A massive tar ball of approximately 11
million gallons spread on Prince William Sound. Oil-soaked birds,
fouled beaches and large black slicks on the water appeared on the na-
tion's television screens. Within weeks, there were three major spills in a
two-day period in Newport, Delaware and Houston. This was followed
by the almost-tragedy of the super tanker Mega Borg off Galveston, and
shortly thereafter, by the tanker spill in Huntington Beach, California,
and several spills in New York Harbor. Exxon Valdez plus these other
events brought home the reality that pollution damages could indeed ex-
ceed available levels of insurance, thereby putting at risk the existence of
the corporate entity and the investment therein. It also showed the
American public that the United States was not immune to the problem.
In the face of these highly publicized events, Congress had three
choices: (1) continue to debate ratification and defer a decision; (2) rat-
ify the international conventions, as recommended by the Coast Guard,
thereby solidifying a uniform international oil spill regime; or (3) react,
as it had in the past, to local concerns and enact legislation with the
greatest domestic political impact.
Such a statement of the choices begs the result. In fact, Congress
refused to go back to its constituents to say that it took power out of the
hands of the states which Askew granted to them to deal with oil pollu-
tion. Preemption of local law simply was an unacceptable solution politi-
cally, and with that decision, the undertaking of the United States
delegation to the IMO Diplomatic Conference to join the international
regime was dashed on the rocks.
Instead, what came out of Exxon Valdez was a new law, ultimately
signed by President Bush on August 18, 1990, known as the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 ("OPA").22 OPA rejected both federal preemption and the
international regime. Instead, it specifically recognized the validity of
state law statutory remedies2 3 and imposed a federal liability scheme
which differs substantially from the international regime.
While both federal and international law provide ostensibly for
strict, limited liability, OPA, with its exceptions to break limitation,
makes it likely that there will be no limitation of liability available in a
major oil spill.24 Thus, under OPA, unlimited strict liability is the prob-
able outcome. This differs materially from the international regime
where liability is limited in most cases, except for intentional or reckless
conduct.25 Currently, most shipowners can secure a maximum of only
$500 million of pollution insurance coverage, making them uninsured
and personally at risk for liabilities above this. 26 Calling at the United
22 33 U.S.C. § 2701 [hereinafter OPAl.
23 OPA § 1018, 33 U.S.C. § 2718.
24 Id. at § 1004(c), 33 U.S.C. at § 2704(c).
25 1984 Protocol, supra note 13, at Art. 6(2); See ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 1, at 10-
147.
26 It is worth noting that insurance capacity has been decreasing. Prior to Exxon Valdez,
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States could now be a "bet the company" decision, and one which could
realistically lead to personal financial ruin for the investor shipowner.
Loan facilities for such investments are disappearing in view of the in-
creased risk of loss of the security for the loan.
Both the U.S. and international regimes call for compulsory insur-
ance with a right of direct action against the pollution insurer shorn of
the traditional policy defenses.27 This has become a critical issue, since
marine insurers have refused to issue OPA compulsory insurance certifi-
cates, requiring them to submit to direct action. Although the require-
ment for an OPA insurance certificate has not yet come into force, if the
insurers continue to refuse to issue certificates for the U.S., it is entirely
possible that no independently-owned vessels will be able to trade to the
United States.
This is a "who blinks first" confrontation, which it appears will
come to a head this summer or fall when the implementing regulations
are expected to be published. Neither side is backing down for the mo-
ment, and Congress has been unresponsive to the warnings given, per-
haps in the belief that the insurers will relent, as they have in the past.
Without independent vessel trade to the United States, the economy of
the Nation will assuredly be severely affected.
Finally, OPA rejected provisions in the Congressional bills which
called for shared cargo liability and placed the entire burden of strict
unlimited liability on the shipowner and vessel operator.28 This change,
brought about through oil company lobbying, altered the entire scheme
of OPA. If the oil companies shared liability, their incentive to hire only
the best ships from independent owners would have been tied directly to
their pocketbooks. Under OPA, their incentive to hire lower quality,
lower priced vessels is encouraged in order to lower shipping costs.
Without the incentive of oil companies' hiring the best vessels at higher
prices through the threat of shared liability, a disincentive has been cre-
ated for the better shipowners to call in the United States, because of the
substantially increased risk of unshared, unlimited liability with no com-
pensating freight adjustment. Consequently, many of the world's most
prestigious shipowners have decided not to call in the United States, cre-
ating the perverse result that oil pollution risk might be greater, not less,
as a result of OPA.
insurance for oil pollution was available through traditional protection and indemnity ("P&I") facil-
ities for US $500 million with additional excess layers of between US $200 million to US $400
million, with some special facilities available for an additional US $300 million. For the reinsurance
renewal period which commenced on February 20, 1992, P&I was able to provide US $500 million
in primary pollution cover, but no excess was offered. It has been suggested that the currently
available US $500 million will be reduced next year.
27 ABECASSIS & JARASHOW, supra note 1, at 10-96 to 10-111; OPA § 1016, 33 U.S.C. § 2716.
28 The House Bill which was brought to the Joint Committee of Conference contained a provi-
sion for shared cargo owner liability. H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). That provision was
struck from the Conference Report on the Bill dated August 1, 1990. The Conference version was
that which was signed by the President on August 18, 1990.
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Engrafted upon the OPA are the laws of each of the coastal states,
each mandating a different liability and regulatory scheme.29 Several
states have done away with any causality requirement, any defenses and
any limitation of liability. If oil is spilled, liability is strict and unlimited.
What this means is that even if the federal law could somehow be
amended to create a climate which would invite shipowners to continue
to do business in the United States, there would still remain the matter of
separate dealings with each of the states. Of course, this might be a
somewhat less difficult problem, because the economic importance of
trading to any one state, or group thereof, is considerably less than the
impact of not trading to the United States at all.
It remains to be seen how the new law of maritime oil pollution will
affect the economy of the United States. Unquestionably, the price of oil
will be higher because of increased components of the transportation
cost. There is already a special extra charge imposed by insurers for al-
lowing vessels to call in the United States. This, of course, pales in the
face of vessels carrying oil, or even non-tankers not trading to the United
States, either because they elect not to call here in light of increased unin-
surable liabilities which risk the existence of the company in an inher-
ently risky business, or because vessels cannot call here in light of
unavailable compulsory financial responsibility certification. In either
event, the effect of the new law on the U.S. economy has potentially ma-
terial adverse implications.
There comes a point at which the great wealth and influence of the
United States will not be enough to permit it to succeed in setting its own
rules out of phase with the international community. The Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 and the rejection of the international regime may have
reached that point. There are really three possibilities: (1) the United
States can remain successfully isolated from the rest of the international
maritime community and accept the greater risk and higher incremental
cost of receiving oil; (2) the rest of the international maritime commu-
nity will adopt the United States' view of liability and materially amend
the current regime to enable U.S. participation; or (3) the United States
will find that its interests are hurt by going it alone.
It is difficult to predict where these new developments will take us,
but it is becoming increasingly evident that the rest of the world is not
prepared to wait for the United States to come aboard. This potentially
nasty economic problem for the United States may well result in an eco-
nomic boom for Canada through the diversion of substantial trade to the
North. U.S. policy makers in Washington have not yet focused on this
serious problem, which will undoubtedly receive attention the day after
29 Twenty four coastal states currently have liability laws for oil pollution: Alabama, Alaska,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and Washington.
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our worst fears are realized if independently owned vessels cease calling
at U.S. ports as a result of an ill-conceived domestic oil spill liability
regime.
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